

29 FEB 1972



Mr. Nixon and Taiwan

President Nixon's political critics were bound to look for something to criticize in the communiqué from the China trip and have correctly seized upon the Taiwan part as being the most promising. It is the only place where Mr. Nixon promises to do a specific thing which, at first blush, sounds new and different.

But it is doubtful that the critics (mostly Democrats and right-of-Nixon Republicans) will get much mileage out of Taiwan because what Mr. Nixon agreed to do in the communiqué is what he was in the process of doing anyway.

Taiwan has long since ceased to be an important American military base. In fact, it never was. The total number of American troops there now is given as 9,990 — which isn't very much as such matters go. And 5,000 of these belong to the 374 Tactical Airlift Wing which was moved to Taiwan at the beginning of the big buildup in Vietnam and will automatically be moved away when the big withdrawal from Vietnam is completed.

The run down from over half a million Americans in Vietnam to the residual force to be left behind (somewhere around 30,000 men) should be completed by mid-summer; certainly well before election day in November. By that time the flow of men and matériel to Vietnam will be down to a normal replenishment basis. It could be down to zero if the China trip should happen to produce a negotiated end to the war (which is possible).

So by the end of this year the number of Americans based on Taiwan would be down to 5,000 men even if there had been no trip to China; and most of those belong to the American Military Aid Group.

At one time there was a large CIA establishment on Taiwan. But that belonged to the days when John Foster Dulles was talking about "roll back" of the "bamboo curtain," and when some Washingtonians seriously thought of a return of Chiang Kai-shek's armies to the mainland. But all of that is long since finished.

The promise in the communiqué is to reduce American forces and military installations "as the tension in the area diminishes." This is nothing new.

There is also a declaration of "ultimate withdrawal" of all American forces. But that, too, has been standard American policy for 20 years. It sounds new. It isn't. And besides, how long is "ultimate"?

Henry Kissinger, in his official briefing to correspondents, asserted that the American security treaty with Taiwan continues in force. So long as it does nothing is changed. Washington still guarantees the military security of Taiwan.

The only thing really new in the communiqué is that Mr. Nixon has reaffirmed standing American policy in a joint communiqué with the Chinese from China. Thus the emphasis is changed, a little. The overtone is one of more concern for Chou En-lai than for Chiang Kai-shek. But Mr. Nixon can claim, correctly, that he has given away nothing new.

28 FEB 1972

U.S. Force on Taiwan Is Said to Number 8,000

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 — American forces on Taiwan, reported to number 8,000 to 9,000, are there to help defend the Chinese Nationalist refuge and they also support American troops in Vietnam.

About half the men are stationed at the Ching Chuan Kang air base in the center of the island near the provincial capital of Taichung, where there are sizable repair facilities. Transports often stop there on the way to Vietnam from Okinawa.

American defense responsibilities under a 1954 treaty are exercised by the Taiwan Defense Command, headed by Vice Adm. Walter Baumberger. The command has only a few hundred men but could be enlarged if hostilities broke out.

Air Force Headquarters

The 13th Air Force has a forward headquarters on Taiwan that is a detachment from its main headquarters at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. It too has a small number of men and only a few Phantom jet fighters.


There have been reports that the United States has deployed nuclear weapons on Taiwan but they have been denied by authoritative sources here and in Asia.

The American military advisory group on Taiwan numbers about 300 men. They help train the Nationalist forces and supervise their supply of American military equipment and weapons.

A contingent of about 1,000 men maintains equipment, runs post exchanges and performs administrative functions.

The Central Intelligence Agency and Air America, a private airline whose only customer is the C.I.A., have installations on Taiwan. United States Government agencies also have extensive radio facilities to transmit to mainland China and to monitor broadcasts.

As President Nixon has reduced the number of American troops in Vietnam, American bases on Taiwan have become less necessary to support that years ago.



The New York Times/Feb. 23, 1972

operation. That presumably will continue to be true as the United States withdraws from Vietnam but the bases may have some use in logistic support of South Vietnamese forces.

History of Defense

When the Chinese Communists came to power on the mainland in 1949, President Truman said that the United States would not become involved in any conflict over the island, to which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had fled.

But when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean war toward the end of 1950, Mr. Truman affirmed American support for the nationalists and began military assistance to Taiwan. President Eisenhower increased military aid.

The 1954 mutual defense treaty defined Nationalist Chinese territory as Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands in the Formosa Strait. American territory to be defended in any attack was defined as "the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction."

In 1955, the Senate adopted the Formosa Resolution, which was intended to give the President a free hand in committing American forces to the defense of Taiwan. An effort in the Senate last year to repeal the resolution failed.

The Seventh Fleet, which had gradually reduced its forces in the Formosa Strait, ceased patrolling that area about two years ago.

STATINTL

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S - 709,123

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Suggestion on Taiwan

Since President Nixon has failed in the Two China policy at the UN, I would suggest an alternative. Give generous financial support through the CIA to the Taiwanese who are attempting to overthrow their present government, the Republic of China, in order to establish an independent Republic of Taiwan.

Since, according to the Pentagon Papers, when Diem became useless in Vietnam be-

cause of his wide-spread unpopularity, the overthrow of his régime was easily accomplished with covert Washington support, similar support in Taiwan might also be successful.

Thomas A. Hope

PUEBLO, COLO.
STAR-JOURNAL
NOV 19 1971

E - 19,198
S - 46,601

STATINTL

Pueblo (Colo.)

Chiang Still Blocks Nixon In Detente With Red China

By ROBERT A. DIAMOND
Congressional Quarterly

WASHINGTON — Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan remains the major stumbling block to President Nixon's efforts to improve relations with Communist China.

Nixon's journey to mainland China — the first presidential state visit in history to any nation with which Washington has no diplomatic relations — is now scheduled for early 1972.

Conveniently removed from the agenda of the Peking summit is the question of China representation at the United Nations. The U.N. General Assembly settled that in October. But two key issues are left — and a third may well be looming in the background:

— The U.S. military commitment to Chiang formalized in a mutual defense treaty and embodied in the presence of U.S. forces on Taiwan.

— Washington's diplomatic ties to Taipei.

— Premier Chou En-lai's charge that "some quarters in the United States" are involved in the Taiwan Independence Movement. The movement, outlawed on Taiwan, seeks to create an independent Taiwan based on the 12 million indigenous Taiwanese who make up 35 per cent of the population.

Korean War era

The Chinese Communists missed their best chance to capture Taiwan in the first six months of 1950. In January of that year, President Truman announced that the United States would no longer "provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."

For the next six months, Chiang was on his own but the expected onslaught from the mainland never came. Then in June, two days after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Truman sent the 7th Fleet into the Formosa strait, declaring that the "occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a

direct threat to the security of the Pacific area, and to the United States forces."

Peking's entry into the Korean War in November 1950 cemented American support for the Nationalist regime. Washington and Taipei signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954.

In January 1955, as the Communists mounted pressure on islands lying a few miles off the mainland and still in Nationalist hands, President Eisenhower asked Congress for explicit authority to use armed forces to protect Taiwan and "related positions and territories." Congress gave overwhelming approval.

In 1958 another offshore island crisis occurred. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles flew to Taipei to announce that the United States would "stand firm" to resist any Chinese Communist attacks and was "not going to attack or tolerate attacks against the Chinese Communists." Thereafter tensions in the strait eased and there has been no crisis in the strait since 1958. In the 1960s, the 7th Fleet presence in the strait was reduced to a permanent two-destroyer patrol.

Nixon Cutbacks

The President has prepared the way for his trip to Peking by taking a number of decisions reducing the U.S. military presence in Taiwan:

— In November 1969, the 7th Fleet quietly terminated its two-destroyer patrol on the Taiwan strait. This "signal" to Peking is generally considered to have paved the way for resumption of the U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in January 1970.

— In July 1971, the administration disclosed that nuclear weapons on Okinawa would not be moved to Taiwan after Okinawa reverts to Japan in 1972. Hearings before the Senate foreign relations subcommittee

disclosed that the Nationalists had modified two airfields in the number recognizing Taipeh is down to 58. Eleven nations have made the switch in 1971, and it is anticipated in Taipei that the U.S. B52s would be moved from Okinawa to Taiwan.

— Also in July 1971, the administration announced that it had ended U.S. air reconnaissance missions over mainland China from Taiwan.

— Since 1969, U.S. forces have been cut from 9,000 to a current figure of 8,000. Additional cuts are expected among units having missions related to the Vietnam war.

In May 1971, the administration announced that it did not object to congressional efforts to repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the repealer, sponsored by Sens. Frank Church, an Idaho Democrat, and Charles McC. Mathias Jr., a Maryland Republican, and attached it to the 1972 foreign aid authorization. Before the aid bill went down to defeat Oct. 29 by a

27-41 vote, the Senate voted 43-40 Oct. 28 to delete the repealer from the bill.

A complete military pullout from Taiwan was recommended in June by Republican Sen. Jacob K. Javits of New York and Democratic Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

China analyst Allen S. Whiting of the University of Michigan told the committee that mainland China had "never developed the necessary air and sea lift capacity to mount an invasion" across the Taiwan strait.

Other analysts testified that Sino-Soviet military tensions made it unlikely that Peking would open up a second front on the Taiwan strait.

At latest count — Nov. 5 — the number of governments recognizing Peking is up to 61, the

number recognizing Taipeh is down to 58. Eleven nations have made the switch in 1971, and it is anticipated in Taipei that the U.N. expulsion will induce 10 or 12 more to switch in the near future.

Since no country has ever maintained diplomatic relations with both Chinas, Nixon has been understandably reticent when newsmen have raised the question of diplomatic ties with Peking. Whereas Premier Chou En-lai has talked in terms of recognition and diplomatic relations, the President has more generally referred to "normalizing" relations and establishing a "dialogue" with the Chinese leaders and people.

Independence

Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir apparent, Deputy Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, narrowly escaped death while visiting New York in April 1970 when he was fired upon by a member of the World United Formosans of Independence.

When the Nationalists and their two million mainland followers came to Taiwan in 1949, they brought with them a governmental structure under which Taiwan was considered a province of the Republic of China. They have continued to rule Taiwan as a province.

The native Taiwanese have been excluded from power under Chiang's authoritarian rule. Chiang has claimed legitimacy for this arrangement by keeping alive the dream of mainland recovery.

Peking is opposed to an independent Taiwan. Chou En-lai told a visiting group of American scholars in July that the "movement . . . has behind it the special manipulation from foreign forces." And in an interview

DES MOINES, IOWA
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Taiwan's Many Little Secret 'Wars'

By Charles F. Ransom

Of The Register's Editorial Page Staff

THE NIXON Administration was offended by the cheering in the United Nations General Assembly at the assembly vote which led to the ousting of Taiwan (the Nationalist "Republic of China").

But for much of the world, Taiwan does not have the "good guy" image it has had in the United States, but is regarded as a usurper to the name of "China" and a troublemaker in east Asia. Taiwan announced regularly its intent to "liberate" the mainland by force, and used what force it could muster.

Besides this open goal, it took part in a series of secret wars, mostly with the help of the United States, some at its instigation.

The world laughed in 1953, when the neophyte Republican Administration in Washington "unleashed Chiang Kai-shek" — that is, stopped preventing him from carrying on hostilities against the Chinese mainland. The U.S. restrained him during the Korean War: one Asian war at a time was more than enough.

Taiwan-Based CIA Airline

But it wasn't funny. Chiang was serious. The pin-prick raids from the offshore islands to the mainland; the heavy concentration of troops and guns on Quemoy, five miles from the mainland; the overflights of mainland China with Taiwan-operated U-2 spy planes furnished by the United States became public at the time or a bit later. But

they were not all the "unleashed" Chiang did.

Allen Whiting, one of America's outstanding China-watchers, pieced together the story for the New York Review of Books. Whiting watched China from the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong 1966-68 and is now a political scientist at the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies. He found evidence of Taiwan's secret wars in the Pentagon Papers, in new studies of China-India relations, in the memoirs of George Patterson, a British missionary-journalist and elsewhere.

It was an airline based on Taiwan, financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which provided transport for U.S.-trained sabotage and guerrilla teams sent into North Vietnam in 1954, when Vietnam was legally at peace.

The same airline provided the transport for the CIA effort to overthrow the Indonesian government in 1958.

Warplanes and transports from Taiwan airdropped arms and supplies to Tibetan rebels in the period from 1951 through 1962, though the major fighting was quickly suppressed in 1951 and 1959. They used refueling bases in Thailand and flew over India and Burma without permission. India and China each thought the planes belonged to the other and complained. The Burmese shot one down, it landed in Thailand and was identified as a Chinese Nationalist bomber from Taiwan.

Taiwan had a secret part in the wars in Laos and South Vietnam, too. Still another CIA-financed airline was formed in 1960, and a third later in the 1960s, and carried on legal commercial passenger and freight business in Laos and Vietnam, and also clandestine military

operations. One job was ferrying guerrilla paratroops trained by the United States in Taiwan. North Vietnam caught some of them in 1963 and sentenced them, but the effort continued. Later Taiwan more or less openly sent several dozen psychological warfare men to South Vietnam.

Equipment Handouts

The United States paid for a lot of this clandestine activity, and also made it possible for Taiwan to maintain large and modern armed forces for a country of only 14 million people. With considerable pride, Taiwan stopped taking open U.S. "military aid" some years ago, but it has continued to get handouts in the form of "excess equipment" — including planes, tanks, missiles and destroyers of not quite the latest model.

Whiting does not say so, but Taiwan enlarged its airport runways to take America's biggest planes, in the hope of replacing Okinawa as base for American strategic bombers and nuclear weapons.

There are only about 8,000 American servicemen on Taiwan now and routine U.S. naval patrols of the Taiwan Strait have stopped, and still more recently U.S. overflights of China have stopped. But the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance continues.

In words this alliance is defensive. But Taiwan's record must look pretty aggressive to mainland China, Burma, India, and other countries which learned about it long before it became public knowledge in the United States.

10 NOV 1971 STATINTL

LETTERS

Burchett on Taiwan
Wilfred Burchett, New York City: Having come to the end of a 20-year-long road of pretence that mainland China belongs to Taiwan, the Nixon administration is now pretending that Taiwan is an independent entity, virtually belonging to the United States. The campaign has started in the U.S. and Japan for an "independent Taiwan." As shown by a reader's letter in the *Guardian* (Nov. 3), people are already being bamboozled by this. But we should be clear about this. It is a logical and expected move after the U.S. was forced to retreat first from the "one-China based on Taiwan" line to the "two-China" policy and now to the third line of retreat—"independent Taiwan." Anyone supporting this, whatever their motives, is supporting U.S. aggression against China and the future expansionist aims of a remilitarizing Japan.

The *Guardian* reader who referred to the "75-year history of Formosan nationalism" and "an abortive revolution even before the CIA existed" is mixing up the anti-Japanese struggle of the entire Chinese people, including the Taiwanese during 50 years of Japanese occupation and the 1947 uprising against the Kuomintang, just as the people of mainland China rose up against the Chiang Kaishek dictatorship. This uprising was put down—with U.S. arms—in a terrible bloodbath that cost at least 10,000 lives. It is true that the Taiwanese have never ceased struggling against the Chiang Kaishek dictatorship as did the people of mainland China until they threw

their U.S.-protected hideout.

The myth of an autonomous Taiwan "independence" movement will be propagated with great fervour from now on. But the fact is that the only such organized movements known to exist so far are based in Japan and the U.S. CIA agents were expelled from Taiwan in June this year for trying to organize a movement there. Can any one really believe that the CIA agents were dispassionately acting in the interests of the Taiwanese people? All they have been doing is to find a Taiwanese Ngo Dinh Diem to replace the aging Chiang who refused to accept a "two-China" or a "one-Taiwan" policy because on that, at least, he knows better.

Nixon's new gimmick is an "independent Taiwan" under a more compliant dictator than Chiang, one who will obviously "invite" continuing U.S. "protection" until such time as the Japanese, having digested Okinawa, which they are due to take over next year, make their next move to Taiwan—perhaps under an agreement similar to that signed in June which enables Japan and the U.S. to share the original U.S. bases on Okinawa. In the late 19th century it took Japan just 16 years to move into Korea and Taiwan after having occupied the Okinawa stepping-stone in 1879. This time Japan is already solidly implanted economically in South Korea and Taiwan.

Under the division of "defense" responsibilities of the Nixon Doctrine, military implantation is sure to come unless Taiwan is fully restored to China as stipulated in the Cairo and Pots-

dam declarations. The only logical explanation for Japan's dogged support of the U.S. on the Taiwan issue is that this province of China is ear-marked for the next phase of Japanese expansionism—unless the present trend in Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party is reversed.

LETTERS

Taiwan independence
Joseph T. Miller, Niles, Ill.
It is obvious from your editorial in the Oct. 20 issue that the Guardian staff has come down with the same malady which afflicts Wilfred Burchett. The editorial of which I write is that headed "Two Americas," and the malady is that of "myopic Sinophobia".

Any radical personage or publication which touts self-determination for the peoples of Indochina and yet rejects the same for the people of Formosa can only hold a double standard. This is one of the most unrealistic viewpoints now prevailing in the U.S. radical movement. Just because China says that Formosa is part of her "sacred territory" doesn't make it so. Mao, himself, rejected that idea in an interview with Edgar Snow in 1936.

Whatever happened to the Guardian of June 9 and its report of a Taiwan independence movement which was frightening Chiang Kai-shek? Did the Guardian proceed to analyze the movement and its history? No, it did not. Instead, a very convenient item in the New York Times solved the dilemma. The item talked about some Americans, one, a CIA agent, being told to leave Formosa because of alleged connections with the independence movement. Well, Burchett hopped on this right away, readily ignoring the 75-year history of Formosan nationalism and the fact of an abortive Formosan revolution even before the CIA existed. He repeated the Chinese claim, both nationalist and com-

unist, that the movement for Formosan independence was a U.S.-Japan "plot." I will allow that with present circumstances, the U.S. would very much like to keep Formosa in its sphere, and the CIA could very well become involved. But, our job is to keep that from happening; to allow the Formosan people to decide their own fate.

Self-determination cannot be limited to certain struggles and the fallacy of Formosa as Chinese territory should not deter us from support of the Formosan people's struggle. Also, we should not cloud the issue with silly editorial analogies which do not jibe with the historical situation of Formosa and her people.

Independent Taiwan a deception

The author of this article, a native of Taiwan now teaching in a North American university, does not wish to be publicly identified.

The People's Republic of China has made it emphatically clear that one of the minimum prerequisites for any kind of "normalization" of Peking-Washington relations is that the U.S. government must recognize Chinese sovereignty over the offshore island of Taiwan.

Tiere are not "two Chinas," insists the Peking government, or "one China and one Taiwan," but one China, of which Taiwan is historically a part.

There is no indication whatsoever, however, that Washington is bent, Dr. Thomas Liao, to come to the U.S. from Japan to publicize the movement's cause. Under severe Nationalist pressure and Okinawa to the Philippines. Despite the "two Chinas" policy Taiwan in 1965. There he at once pledged support for the Nation Washington is pushing in the UN this week in an effort to save alists. Chiang Kai-Shek's seat in the world body, long-range U.S. politi- The movement fell into disarray for the next few years until cal objectives focus on the "one China, one Taiwan" formulation. 1970. In January came the news that a respected Taiwanese pro-

At present, Washington is apparently pressuring Chiang's Nationalist regime to renounce its claim to being the government of all China. If this fails, as is likely, the adamant Chiang may be replaced by someone willing to cooperate with Washington. This may require a coup similar to the one that toppled Diem when he became a hindrance to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. It is significant that Gen. Sun Li-Jen, the pro-American former commander of Chiang's army, who was purged and placed under house arrest for allegedly masterminding an ill-fated coup against Chiang in 1955, "escaped" from Taiwan 10 months ago. He was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and served with Gen. Joseph Stilwell in the China-Burma-India theatre during World War II. Some of Sun's officers charged in the 1955 coup were executed but Sun was merely put under house arrest, thanks to his powerful American friends. His "escape" could mean he has a part in Washington's contingency plans.

Father Peng Ming-Min had mysteriously escaped from the island and had turned up in Sweden. A law professor at the National Taiwan University, Peng had been the "kept Taiwanese" displaced by someone willing to cooperate with Washington. This played in the Nationalist UN delegation until 1964 when he and several of his students were arrested on charges of subversive activities. In a secret summary trial before the military tribunal that handles all political cases, Peng was sentenced to eight years in prison. Pressure from the American academic community secured his release from prison although he was kept under continuous house arrest. A few months after appearing in Sweden, Peng was admitted into the U.S. and is now a research scholar at the University of Michigan. It's a well known "secret" in the independence movement that the escape was the work of the CIA. Both People's China and Chiang accuse the U.S. of "smuggling" Peng out of Taiwan to make him the puppet leader of the future "independent" Taiwan.

Another active consideration in Washington, in conjunction with the above or perhaps separately, would require the active cooperation of the "Taiwanese Independence Movement." For those unfamiliar with the history of the Taiwan question, a brief outline here may be necessary. Taiwan was settled by Chinese from Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. After being defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, China ceded Taiwan to Japan. For the next 50 years Taiwan was ruled by Japan.

Taiwanese have always regarded themselves as Chinese. When Taiwan was returned to China after World War II, Taiwanese welcomed Chiang's Nationalist army as a liberator. Chiang's troops, however, soon showed their true nature by widespread pillage, rape and murder of the native population. Taiwanese rage exploded into open rebellion on Feb. 28, 1947, after police beat to death a woman who allegedly sold untaxed cigarettes. Within one month, the rebellion was suppressed at the cost of at least 10,000 Taiwanese lives.

In 1949, Chiang and the remnants of his government and armies were driven out of the Chinese mainland and sought refuge on Taiwan. To ensure its rule over Taiwan, Chiang proclaimed a general "stage of siege" or martial law to last as long as the "period of communist rebellion" existed on the Chinese mainland—that is, until Chiang's troops reoccupied the mainland. Thus, for more than two decades Taiwanese have been subjected to rule by martial law without any civil liberties.

Of Taiwan's 15 million population, about 85% is Taiwanese and 15% Chiang's Nationalist mainlanders. The hostility of the Taiwanese towards the repressive Nationalist rule is deep-seated. In the 1960s, Taiwanese in Japan, Europe and the U.S. formed different groups agitating for Taiwanese independence. Most of them came from the upper-middle class which aspires to get into the driver's seat now occupied by the Nationalists. (The super-rich Taiwanese are content to serve the Nationalists as they did the Japanese.)

Communism the main enemy

They consider Chinese communists their enemy number one before the Nationalists. Their main strategy—that of convincing Washington that an independent Republic of Taiwan is, in the long run, the best means of preventing the island from falling into communist hands—obtained no sympathetic hearing at the time. To placate Chiang Kai-shek during the early 1960s, the U.S. repeatedly refused to permit then leader of the independence movement, Dr. Thomas Liao, to come to the U.S. from Japan to publicize the movement's cause. Under severe Nationalist pressure upon his family in Taiwan, Liao capitulated and returned to Taiwan in 1965. There he at once pledged support for the Nationalists.

The movement fell into disarray for the next few years until 1970. In January came the news that a respected Taiwanese professor Peng Ming-Min had mysteriously escaped from the island and had turned up in Sweden. A law professor at the National Taiwan University, Peng had been the "kept Taiwanese" displayed in the Nationalist UN delegation until 1964 when he and several of his students were arrested on charges of subversive activities. In a secret summary trial before the military tribunal that handles all political cases, Peng was sentenced to eight years in prison. Pressure from the American academic community secured his release from prison although he was kept under continuous house arrest. A few months after appearing in Sweden, Peng was admitted into the U.S. and is now a research scholar at the University of Michigan. It's a well known "secret" in the independence movement that the escape was the work of the CIA. Both People's China and Chiang accuse the U.S. of "smuggling" Peng out of Taiwan to make him the puppet leader of the future "independent" Taiwan.

Early in 1970, various factions of the movement united in New York into the World United Taiwanese for Independence and hailed Peng as its leader. In April, this organization made international news when two of its members attempted to assassinate Chiang Kai-Shek's son and heir apparent in New York. The two terrorists are now out on bail and the organization which openly claimed credit for the assassination attempt has been left unharassed by U.S. authorities.

Congress members see "moral" issue

In the meanwhile, voices have begun to be heard in Congress advocating the "one-China-one-Taiwan" policy. On Aug. 28, 1970, Rep. Donald Fraser of Minnesota made a speech and placed in the Congressional Record a long paper entitled "Political Repression in 'Free China,'" in which he concluded "Free China" is neither "Free" nor "China." (Copies of this paper were reprinted and widely circulated among Taiwanese in the U.S.) He emphasized that "just as we must cease our support, moral and material,


of the Nationalist regime on Formosa [Taiwan], we must not surrender the fate of Formosa to the Chinese... It is clear that the most important contribution the U.S. can make is its support of the morally right position—self-determination. The people of Taiwan are capable of directing their own affairs."

On Feb. 2, 1971, a group of 10 influential Congressmen, led by Jacob Javits of New York, introduced a resolution in the Senate urging the U.S. to drop its opposition to People's China admission to the UN. The resolution specified Nationalist China should not be expelled from the UN to make room for Peking. This is exactly the line the U.S. is following in the UN now. However, Sen. Javits also proposed that the people of Taiwan in an "internationally supervised plebiscite determine, at a suitable time, what they wish to be the permanent status of Taiwan in the community of nations." This is what the "Taiwanese Independence Movement" has been requesting for years.

It seems quite evident that Nixon considers the "one-China-one-Taiwan" scheme the best solution from the U.S. point of view. Just as the U.S. stalled for time at the 1954 Geneva Conference while actively preparing to set up a puppet government in South Vietnam, Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking and the half-hearted peddling of the two-Chinas policy in the UN may be just a smoke screen under which a made-in-U.S.A. "Republic of Taiwan" is being manufactured.

The idea of an "independent" Taiwan at this point in history is a charade to cover up continuing U.S. (and to a large extent, Japanese) economic domination of the island and to retain Taiwan as a U.S. military base a stone's throw from mainland China. The Peking government, of course, has repeatedly warned Washington that the "one China, one Taiwan" scheme is just as unacceptable as the "two China's" policy and there is little possibility its position will change.

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Gaps in Nixon-Mao publicity

By TOM FOLEY

Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking and the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China are now getting tremendous publicity in the U.S. news media. But many questions about this apparent U.S.-PRC rapprochement remain unanswered—at least, publicly—and the detailed speculation in the U.S. press deliberately seems to avoid these areas. They are the following:

1) Northern Burma and Laos: ever since the Chinese civil war, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been deeply involved in this region just south of the Chinese province with the romantic name of Yunnan, or "Cloudy South" province. In 1949, the defeated remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army crossed over into north Burma and Laos, seized control of these outlying areas, and began calling themselves the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army. Actually, they are the biggest opium dealers in Southeast Asia and they have been financed and armed since 1949 by the CIA.

In Laos, the CIA organized, trained and equipped, the 50,000-man secret army led by Gen. Vang Pao, composed of his Meo tribesmen followers, who are the biggest opium smugglers in Southeast Asia. But everybody knows that the CIA created this Meo military force not only for use in Laos: in Yunnan, there are 4.5 million Meo tribesmen who form the most important national minority in south China and who have maintained their ties with their relatives across the Laos border.

2) Tibet and northern Nepal: in 1959, when revolt broke out among the Amdo and Khampa tribesmen of Tibet, it did not require great insight to see the CIA hand involved in it. The Khampas were armed with brand new U.S. equipment, including GI fatigue uniforms and thermoboots. Since both Tibetans and Chinese hate and fear the Khampas, the CIA made a serious political mistake in backing them, because everybody else allied against them. They did get the Dalai Lama, however, probably because he is of Amdo, not Tibetan origin, and was born in China. About 20,000 Khampas

and Amdos fled mainly into northern Nepal after the 1959 revolt and simply took over the country in conjunction with the CIA and U.S. military in Nepal. As far as anybody knows, most of them are still there.

3) Taiwan and CIA air bases: as everybody except the ordinary American citizen knows, Taiwan is headquarters for the CIA's vast air operations in Asia. The CIA base is at Tainan and is run by a front organization called Air Asia, which also has an office in downtown Taipei. Air Asia in turn is a subsidiary of Air America, the CIA line which provides all supply and transport runs for CIA operations in Laos, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. Air America has its offices in Okinawa; it is a Delaware corporation with about 4,000 employees listed on its records as working in Asia.

The CIA base at Tainan, in southwest Taiwan, was the launching point for all CIA operations against the Chinese mainland, including parachute drops and reconnaissance flights. This is also well known to everybody except the American people.

But the curious fact is that the U.S. news media have not mentioned a word about any of these areas, and neither has the U.S. government. The Chinese side has been completely silent about them as well.

Any real normalization of U.S.-China relations demands that all these CIA operations be ended—and not only in China—and that the American people finally be told the truth about them in detail.

17 AUG 1971

STATINTI

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Little Strategic Loss Seen In a Pullout From Taiwan

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 — Many United States military planners, looking to the possible results of change in Washington's policy on China, believe that a withdrawal of American forces and installations from Taiwan would not substantially weaken this country's strategic position in the Far East.

Senior military men interviewed here said that while they would rather not see a sudden reduction in forces on the Nationalist-held island, they foresaw no dire consequences if political decisions called for withdrawal as urged by Peking.

Premier Chou En-lai of China, in meetings with visiting journalists and scholars in recent weeks, has insisted that the American military presence must be removed from Taiwan if Washington wants more normal relations with Peking.

High American officials have avoided public comment on the demand. But late last month, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, when asked about the military value of American forces on Taiwan, answered:

"If we are going to perform adequately and carry forward on the Nixon doctrine of partnership, strength and showing a willingness to negotiate, now is not the time to take unilateral actions in withdrawing or in lessening the credibility of our deterrent."

Advantages Outlined

Nonetheless, military planners are assessing the implications of a force reduction on Taiwan if it should be ordered. In their view, Taiwan currently offers these principal advantages:

Excellent repair facilities for tanks and trucks used in Vietnam and a relatively close supply base for the Indochina war.

A relatively small headquarters to develop joint contingency plans for the defense of Taiwan under the mutual defense treaty between the Nationalist Government and the United States.

Extensive communications-intelligence facilities to eavesdrop on military communications on mainland China.

Stores of tactical nuclear weapons for use against China in the event of a major war.

Vietnam Pullouts Cited

On the first factor, military planners say that as the United States continues to reduce its troops and activity in South Vietnam, the need for repair and resupply facilities diminishes.

Of the fewer than 9,000 United States military personnel stationed on Taiwan, about two-thirds are involved in the repair and supply effort. Thirty-three C-130 transports, based at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, fly regular resupply missions to South Vietnam and Thailand.

The Taiwan Defense Command, which is manned by about 200 Americans from all services, works out contingency plans with Taipei under the 1954 mutual security treaty.

Military sources say that if it becomes necessary to reduce this command to a handful of men, they could be based in the United States Embassy, with the others transferred to Pacific command headquarters in Honolulu. These men could shuttle back and forth to Taipei as direct consultations were required.

The planners say that contingency plans do not include the use of American ground troops in any defense of Taiwan. United States military involvement, should it become necessary, would be primarily those of ships and planes of the Seventh Fleet, together with Air Force planes from the Philippines and Guam.

The Military Assistance and Advisory Group, which helps train Nationalist soldiers in using American equipment, numbers 300 to 400 men. This group, too, could be sharply reduced if necessary, officials say.

The United States maintains a substantial eavesdropping and cryptographic effort centered at Shihlinko Air Base. While sources are reluctant to discuss this intelligence activity, some have suggested that the information it develops on such matters as the movement of troops and air units within China has not been all that valuable.

More useful, they say, has been information on the radar frequencies air defense facilities for use in the event of war. Pentagon sources said this sort of information could be obtained just as easily from electronic intelligence planes and ships operating from international waters and air space.

miles from China," one general said. "We'd like to keep some weapons there."

But he and other military officials acknowledged that if the White House decided otherwise, greater reliance could be placed on B-52 bombers operating from Guam.

Overflights Halted

Reconnaissance flights over mainland China were terminated in July to avoid any incident that could interfere with President Nixon's planned visit to China. The most valuable intelligence information, however, comes from reconnaissance satellite missions, which are continuing.

Experts say China has been very skillful in hiding military construction from reconnaissance cameras. Railroad spur lines to missile sites were cleverly camouflaged, they say, that it was difficult to confirm China's first deployment of operational medium-range missiles last summer.

Tactical nuclear weapons, primarily nuclear bombs with about three times the force of those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are the most controversial aspect of the American military presence on Taiwan.

Three F-4 fighter-bombers able to carry nuclear bombs are based at Tainan Air Base, on detached duty from the Philippines.

Military planners say that in the unlikely event of a major war with China, Washington would probably not want to use Minuteman or Titan missiles fired from the United States since they would have to pass over Soviet territory on the way to China.

Weapons to Leave Okinawa

The bulk of nuclear weapons that might be employed, they say, are Polaris missiles on submarines in the Pacific, bombs stored aboard Seventh Fleet carriers and tactical nuclear weapons on Guam and in the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea. Additional weapons on Okinawa are to be removed before the island reverts to Japanese control.

"Taiwan, in effect, is an unsinkable aircraft carrier 100

'Agenda In Peking'

STATINTL

Fought, vilified, snubbed during the 22 years it has been sovereign, the Peoples Republic of China now takes note of the President's desire to talk and states that he will be welcome in Peking. It is a high-risk journey and those who want peace will wish him well. They will also keep their fingers crossed. The procedural arrangements alone are tricky: who can recall when a head of state visited another state that he did not formally recognize? Protocol covers such small but symbolic items as what flags will fly, in what position, and where; arrival and departure ceremonies; press and personnel privileges; security arrangements; the question of joint or separate communiques and the language they entail. Transportation may be thorny. Presumably the head of state has his own plane, and the intelligence implications of this are apparent to both parties. This is true also for communications facilities during the President's visit. In short, what is dismissed casually as "technical" consumes a great amount of time and may cause trouble - if either side at any point chooses to use "procedural" questions for that purpose.

The main item on the agenda is of course Taiwan. Here the President is in the position of a man wanting to hurdle a fence while keeping one foot, or at least one toe, in place. He would be faithful, in his fashion, to an Old Friend, while courting the Old Friend's enemy. Chiang has doubtless been informed that the United States will no longer resist Peking's claim to the Security Council seat in the United Nations. But if Chiang insists (and would he not?), the US will try to make the expulsion of Nationalist China from the General Assembly an "important question," thereby requiring a two-thirds Assembly vote. It is reasonable to assume that an agreement with Peking to disagree on this issue has already been reached, and that the trip was deemed sufficiently worthwhile by both sides to warrant separate positions, at least for the coming UN vote. It amounts to Mr. Nixon's telling the Chinese what he will do and the Chinese agreeing that this will not upset the visit, although they oppose his doing it. Then comes the hard part.

Chou En-lai's position has been consistent since the mid-fifties: Peking's relations with Chiang Kai-shek are Peking's business; the American presence on Taiwan is an international question on

which Washington and Peking can deal. The US view has been that before our presence can be negotiated away, Peking must renounce the use of force. Mr. Nixon will probably not now insist on this explicit formulation; at the same time it is highly improbable that the US would "negotiate" an exit from Taiwan, unless the Chinese did in fact "renounce the use of force." So the differences must be deftly skirted; the game to be played is the eliciting of tacit positions which meet the other side's goals, without specifically devising a *quid pro quo* that loses too much face for anyone. This makes the shaping of an agenda a task of extraordinary intricacy. Peking's

objective, at a minimum, is the removal of all US military presence, materiel and personnel from the islands under Chiang Kai-shek's rule, including the offshore islands. Next in order of importance to Peking is cessation of all clandestine operations directed against the mainland from Chinese Nationalist bases with US assistance, whether mounted in this area or elsewhere. Third, less burning, is an end to intelligence collection (reconnaissance flights, infiltration teams). Fourth, and perhaps not foreseen by Peking as achievable in this round of talks, is US renunciation of its mutual defense agreement with the Nationalist Chinese. Finally, Peking would like Mr. Nixon to terminate diplo-

17 JUL 1971

STATINTL

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Nationalist Chinese Unease

Repression in Taiwan

Taipei

The Nationalist Chinese government, made up for the most part of the two million Mainlanders who moved here in 1948 and 1949, rides uneasily on the backs of the 12 million native Taiwanese, whose ancestors emigrated from the Mainland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The reassertion of the Nationalists' political authority after 50 years of Japanese occupation that ended with World War II was sealed with the execution in March 1947, of some 10,000 Taiwanese business and intellectual leaders by newly arrived Mainland troops. Though discussion of it is forcibly repressed, the schism remains.

The Taiwanese uprising of February 28, 1947, which inspired the brutal repression, was in protest against the heavy-handedness of the occupying Nationalist forces and the appropriation of jobs and property by the newly arrived Mainlanders. Little has changed in 22 years. Only death has any significant effect on this gerontocracy. Taiwanese are almost completely shut out of jobs in the National government; all police chiefs and most officers in the armed forces are Mainlanders or their descendants born here; 40 percent of positions in the provincial and local governments are held by Mainlanders, and their children are 29 percent of the college and university students, though they make up only 13 percent of the civilian population. Economic growth has reduced this imbalance (Taiwan now enjoys a standard of living second only to Japan's in Asia), but it is a rare Taiwanese who has anything good to say about the government in private.

Should the almost unbroken economic improvement of the last 15 years begin to falter, only their monopoly of armed power would stand between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese majority. Always acutely conscious of this fact, the government has built a large and extensive network of political police and informers. Anything remotely connected with political dissent that goes beyond nit-picking is suppressed, including scenes of a political demonstration in the Jack Lemmon comedy, "The Out-of-Towners," and the entry for "Mao Tse-tung" in the English-language dictionaries pirated here in great abundance. (The government has never signed the international copyright convention.) Reasoning that the "temporary retreat" to Taiwan constitutes an emergency, the government retains martial law. "Spreading rumors" is punishable by a term of from seven years to life. The controlled newspapers used to publish news of arrests for "anti-government" activities, but this practice has ceased; informal channels have had to take over. It was estimated late last year

that there are some 4,000 political prisoners in Taiwan's jails. The vast majority of these are Taiwanese.

Writers, teachers, and intellectuals are among the most prominent recent victims of the security forces. Po Yang, a leading novelist and essayist, was sentenced in a secret military trial in the fall of 1969 to 12 years in prison; his crime: attending a Communist spy school in Manchuria for two days 20 years earlier and trying (unsuccessfully) to persuade a friend to remain behind on the Mainland rather than flee to Taiwan. Last fall several writers on the *Central Daily News*, the newspaper of the ruling Nationalist Party were rounded up, along with a vice president of the leading broadcasting company. In April, another of the island's leading writers, Li Ao, was arrested in a sweep that also gathered in Meng Hsiang-ko, a translator of Hesse's works into Chinese; Ts'ai Mao-t'ang, a scholar and teacher at the American-run Stanford Language Center; and perhaps a dozen others. One reliable estimate is that 65 such suspects were picked up in February and March alone.

The political prisoner here is held incommunicado for months. Nothing appears in the newspapers about arrests, charges, or sentences. Chinese officials contend that the torture and beatings used in the past have been abandoned, but in the rare case that is tried publicly witnesses are likely to hear the defendant repudiate his "confession" on the grounds that it was extracted only after long and uninterrupted questioning. The right to cross-examine is denied. Like their brothers on the Mainland, the government provides a kind of thought-reform for its most tractable dissidents; officials consider a three-year sentence to one of the minimum-security thought-reform prisons a merciful outcome for the defendant, even where the offense is negligible. Given the ugly reputation of other prisons here, they may be right.

An American missionary and his wife were expelled in March for alleged involvement with the Taiwanese Independence Movement, which is active in Japan and the United States but rarely surfaces here. Within the last few months the American Armed Forces have quietly shipped out several military men at the behest of the Chinese authorities, for the same reason. Taiwanese and Mainlander alike believe that the escape from house arrest here of the Taiwanese professor Peng Ming-min, who is now in Michigan, was engineered by the CIA.

The government has argued that it is in the interest of the US to help suppress the Taiwanese, on the theory that an independent Taiwan would be sympathetic to the Mainland. This assertion has found a less sympathetic hearing on the US side in recent months, especially since the mild flirtation between the US and the People's Republic of China. It is conceivable that a Taiwanese-run government with status as a province or semi-autonomous region of the People's Republic might serve the US and the Mainland as a

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continued

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

AUG 11 1971

STATINTL

Peril to Nixon Trip Seen

Secrecy Is Charged In U.S. Aid to Taiwan

By RAY MOSELEY

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington — A former State Department official said today the Government is concealing the full extent of U.S. military and intelligence operations on Taiwan (Formosa) from Congress and the American public.

Such operations, directed against mainland China, must cease if President Nixon's forthcoming "journey for peace" to Peking is to succeed, said Allen S. Whiting, chief China specialist in the State Department from 1962 to 1966.

Whiting, now a professor at the University of Michigan, testified at a hearing on China policy conducted by the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

Quotes From Documents

Quoting official documents and news reports, Whiting outlined a variety of alleged U.S. intelligence activities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan that have

come to light over the last 20 years, and said:


"In sum, there is a credible case that overt and covert U.S.-Chinese Nationalist activities have aroused Chinese Communist security concerns, resulting in heightened military deployments toward and across China's borders. This activity, in turn, has been used to justify increased American and allied military investment throughout Asia to guard against the so-called Chinese Communist aggressive threat."

Whiting said a complete assessment of U.S. involvement with the Nationalists has been seriously hampered by secrecy and censorship.

"Certainly Peking has known more of what has been going on than has Washington, or at least the legislative branch of our government," he said.

May Block Settlement

Whiting said U.S. covert activities on Taiwan may block a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem by the Nationalists and Communists and lead to continued military



Allen S. Whiting

escalation on both sides.

"Only a convincing and credible reversal of our military-intelligence use of Taiwan can lay the basis for confidence necessary to make President Nixon's 'journey for peace' a successful reality," he said.

The Nixon Administration was reported recently to have ordered a halt to clandestine activities, including U.S. spy plane flights over China, to avoid upsetting plans for Mr. Nixon's trip.

In his testimony, Whiting cited these examples of covert activities allegedly supported by the U.S. against China:

Airlines' Activities

— The Nationalist airline Civil Air Transport (CAT), identified in the recent Pentagon Papers as owned by the Central Intelligence Agency, operated from bases in Thailand in the 1950s to ferry supplies to guerrillas in northern Burma, Laos, Tibet and China's Yunan Province.

— China Air Lines (CAL), another apparent CIA operation, provided planes and pilots to Vietnam and Laos and admitted involvement in "clandestine intelligence operations."

— A CIA line called Air Asia is headquartered in Taiwan, with the job of servicing jet fighter planes.

— U.S. Rangers have trained guerrilla paratroopers in Taiwan, and some Nationalist forces have served secretly in South Vietnam.

— Nationalist China has received "a steady stream of cut-rate weapons out of the mammoth Vietnam stockpile" and some deliveries have been "unauthorized, uncontrolled and often unknown to the Congress."

STATINTL

PARADE'S SPECIAL

EDITED
by LLOYD SHEARER

**FAREWELL
CHIANG**

This country, which has spent 50,000 young lives, 120 billion dollars, and 300,000 war casualties to prevent South Vietnam from going Communist, will probably recognize Red China within two years.

The word around UN headquarters is that Red China --the Nixon Administration now refers to Mao's nation as "Mainland China"--will be admitted to the family of nations this fall.

This means that somewhere along the line America's 22-year-old recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's regime as "the Nationalist Government of China" will go by the boards..

As President Nixon talks of the "journey" toward "a more normal relationship with Mainland China...," Chiang Kai-shek at age 83 is confronted with a loss of face on Taiwan and can no longer perpetuate the fiction that he is the rightful leader of some 750 million Chinese.

Chiang fled to Taiwan in 1949 with 2 million Chinese mainlanders and has kept 12 million Taiwanese islanders under his benevolent despotism ever since.

Once he passes on, his son and successor, Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo, 65, will find it difficult to control the local Taiwanese militants.

A few weeks ago five American military personnel and an agent from the Central Intelligence Agency were transferred out of Taiwan because Chiang's secret police said they were teaching the Taiwanese guerrilla war tactics.

STATINTL

PHOENIX, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC

M - 166,541
S - 252,975

JUL 3 1971

Hughes de Toldano

CIA plot to kill Chiang revealed



Sometimes it takes years for the news to make Page One. In November of 1963, any well-informed Washington correspondent knew that the Central Intelligence Agency had been deeply

involved in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam. And at the cocktail hour, in the capital's most frequented watering hole, the suspicion was frequently voiced that CIA shared complicity in Diem's assassination. Today, almost seven and a half years later, Americans can read the story over their morning coffee.

There are other CIA stories of some concern to the citizenry, but since they do not touch on the Vietnam war, they will not be found in the batch of classified papers now being pawed over by the nation's press. One such story is so incredible that I have not published it even though I checked it out just as high as you can go in this government without talking to the President. In the general letting-down of hair that has followed publication by the New York Times of the Vietnam papers, there may be some value in reciting my story—if only to use it as a peg on which to hang some questions about CIA operations.

Buck in the early '50s, the Central Intelligence Agency decided that it would be a better world if President Chiang Kai-shek, then digging in on Taiwan, would shuffle off his mortal coil. With the Generalissimo gone, all those pesky questions of Red Chinese admission to the United Nations would become moot. The Nationalist regime would collapse, and Mao Tse-tung could move into the vacuum.

Somewhere within the bowels of CIA headquarters, plans for the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek were made. A team was assigned to do the job and \$5 million was allocated—the money to be spent in setting up the operation in Taipei, bribing such officials as could be bribed, creating a cover, etc. I was never able to determine what non-CIA officials—if any—were informed.

But because CIA security at the time was about as water-tight as a colander, the Republic of China's Intelligence picked up details of the plot even before the CIA team had unpacked its bags in Taipei. President Chiang was informed. According to my account, however, the Generalissimo refused to give the order to "take care" of the team. "Let's get their \$5 million first," he is reported to have said. The CIA team, therefore, was led down a cloak-and-dagger garden-path, never getting within range of President Chiang.

By the time the money was spent, the Central Intelligence Agency had changed its mind—or had it changed by more responsible people in the United States government. The team was recalled.

When I checked out the story, the very important official who confirmed it said, "Sure it's true. CIA had a similar plan to knock off Syngman Rhee (then President of Korea) but we stopped it." In the context of the conversation, the "we" referred to the National Security Council.

That the two operations were scrubbed of course made a considerable difference to Presidents Chiang and Rhee—not to mention the course of history. But scrubbed or completed, the principle remains the same. The Central Intelligence Agency, a secret arm of the American government, had taken on itself life and death decisions which involved the integrity of this nation and which could have generated results touching on war or peace in the world.

CIA, moreover, had embarked on actions which went far beyond the all-too-liberal license it had been given by the Congress in authorizing the agency. And that has been CIA's way in less grisly areas of its endeavor. It compromised the freedom of the press in the '50s by

hiring newspapermen as "consultants," thereby sealing lips and silencing criticism. Whether or not this practice has continued is anybody's guess.

The CIA's original function was to gather intelligence, not to interfere in world politics. There might have been some justification for its activities as one of many participants in Guatemala and in Cuba where it was involved only with the sanction of higher authority. But in the instant cases, CIA was a law unto itself. A thoughtful person might ask: Is it still?

WIRETAPPING IS ON THE UPSWING in Asia.

Taiwan and South Korea have joined Hong Kong and Japan in extensive utilization of electronic eavesdropping.

Most of the bugging is to nab tax evaders, wheeler-dealers, drug king-pins.

But a lot of the snooping is done for political motives.

Especially in Taiwan.

Taipei's hallmark used to be simply the regular opening of mail of foreigners, or local nationals who corresponded with foreigners.

That old-fashioned tactic is still used extensively in Indonesia, Thailand and Burma.

Taiwan "graduated" to electronic eavesdropping recently.

Now, virtually every foreigner on the island has his telephone tapped!

Wiretapping evidence was responsible for the recent expulsion of several American military and intelligence operatives.

Japan's snooping is mainly for economic and commercial reasons.

Several of the largest---and most respected---Japanese firms hire private detective agencies to snoop on foreign competitors operating inside Japan.

Corporate espionage is big business in Japan---snooping on foreigners is only slightly more comprehensive than Japanese commercial firms' snooping on each other.

South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency is the No. 1 bugging outfit in that country.

The operations have the tacit approval of new Premier KIM CHONG-PIL.

Hong Kong has probably used sophisticated wiretapping methods longer than any Asia locale.

The standing joke among Hong Kong police officers is that the reasons for entry visa restrictions is that "if we tap one more phone the bloody island will sink into the sea from the sheer weight of all the electronic bugs."

Lately, Hong Kong authorities have begun to tap the phones of certain real estate, advertising, and airlines offices in the colony.

CHANGE OF VENUE, or at least location, for the U.S.-China talks is due soon.

The talks, when they are resumed, will be switched from Warsaw, Poland, to Ottawa, Canada.

HUANG HUA, China's most experienced diplomat, is the present Peking Ambassador to Canada. He spends most of his time these days studying about the U.S. rather than Canada.

HOUSTON TEX
TRIBUNEJUL 1 1971
WEEKLY - 33,102

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Second Betrayal Of Free Chinese?

By ROBERT MORRIS

TAIPEI, TAIWAN.--Here in Taipei I am experiencing for the first time not only a lack of optimism for the future, but an uneasy sense of alarm.

I am here to address the graduating class of Fu Jen, the young, vigorous Catholic University in the outskirts of Taipai and to participate with the magnificent cardinal Paul Yu Pin, Fu Jen's rector, in the dedication of the new hospital grounds in the suburb of Naihu.

There is no unrest here, crime is virtually non-existent, prosperity abounds (per capita income here is 38 times that of mainland China and foreign trade for the 13.8 million in Taiwan is fast approaching that of the 700,000,-000 people in Red China). The clear innocent faces of the undergraduate at the University and of the student nurses at the hospital are a joy to behold and a striking contrast to what we are becoming used to in the western capitals of the world.

Yet one experienced observer said to me, "The Communists could not conquer Taiwan by military means but it looks as if they may now by diplomacy-ours."

"SECOND RETRAYAL"

Dr. Anthony Kubek, the respected historian who has been here since February teaching in three different universities, is planning a new book which he will call "The Second Betrayal of China."

On June 15 President Chiang Kai-shek said, "During the last five months we have experienced a sequence of adversity, insult and suffering."

All evidence points to a campaign at State Department and CIA level to isolate this island republic as a redoubt to CIA

sion and as to spike it as a springboard for liberty's return to the mainland.

There is much talk among the Americans here of a two China policy but this is deceptive because those using the expression must intend to beguile because they cannot mean what those words convey. There just cannot be two Chinas in the United Nations.

Those using these words do so to conceal the repugnance of expelling the Republic of China which has been a model member of the U.N. and a loyal ally, to support in its place the sanguinary "People's Republic of China" which is, by every civilized standard, ineligible to become a member of the "peace-loving" council of nations.

What these planners are trying to accomplish is a compromise or a sop, perhaps even by resolution, is to admit the government here, not as the "Republic of China" but as "Taiwan".

CIA FABRICATION

But since this would mean the admission of a new member, it would be vetoed by either the Soviet Union or the newly admitted Red China. In other words, "Taiwan's" admission would be dependent on the consent of the Communists. Already, as if to curry Mao's favor for the eventuality, the evidence points to the CIA fabricating an independent Taiwanese movement on the island. There is no such thing here except as it is imported from the United States.

The "Taiwanese" are Chinese who originated mostly from South Fukien province in mainland China. Under Chiang's rule they are eminently successful and some

a difference between the two groups of Chinese but it is even less than that which exists between the very heterogeneous provinces and dialects on the mainland.

With the isolation of Taiwan, recognition of Red China would follow admission to the U.N. and the insurgency that Mao is waging all over Asia at this very moment would become legitimized and it would only be a question of time before the whole continent would become crimson.

But there are areas of hope. So far President Nixon has not indicated conclusively that he is going along with these CIA maneuvers but the state of alarm persists.

President Chiang is a proud man and he will never surrender and he has the complete loyalty of all the people here.

DANVILLE, VA.
REGISTER

STATINTL

M - 10,742
S - 22,644

JUN 27 1971

Ralph de Toledano

Diem's Death Showed CIA Law Unto Itself

Sometimes it takes years for the news to make page one. In November of 1963, any well-informed Washington correspondent knew that the Central Intelligence Agency had been deeply involved in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam. And at the cocktail hour, in the capital's most frequent watering hole, the suspicion was frequently voiced that the CIA shared complicity in Mr. Diem's assassination. Today, almost 7½ years later, Americans can read the story over their morning coffee.

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Somewhere within the bowels of CIA headquarters, plans for the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek were made. A team was assigned to do the job and \$5 million was allocated — the money to be spent in setting up the operation in Taipei, bribing such officials as could be bribed, creating a cover, etc. I was never able to determine what non-CIA officials — if any — were informed.

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en on itself life and death decisions which involved the integrity of this nation and which could have generated results touching on war or peace in the world.

CIA, moreover, had embarked on actions which went far beyond the all-too-liberal license it had been given by the Congress in authorizing the agency. And that has been CIA's way in less grisly areas of its endeavor. It compromised the freedom of the press in the Fifties by hiring newspapermen as "consultants," thereby sealing lips and silencing criticism. Whether or not this practice has continued is anybody's guess.

The CIA's original function was to gather Intelligence, not to interfere in world politics. There might have been some justification for its activities as one of many participants in Guatemala and in Cuba where it was involved only with the sanction of higher authority. But in the instant cases, CIA was a law unto itself. A thoughtful person might ask: Is it still?

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The real China lobby

Curious behavior of CIA in China

Edward Hunter is editor of the monthly *Tactics* magazine of Arlington, Va., that focusses on analysis and news of psychological warfare. He has authored a number of books on the subject. His enlarged edition of "Brain-Washing in Red China" (Vanguard Press, Inc., New York), that gives the pattern for "sensitivity training," is now coming from the presses.

By Edward Hunter

THE REAL China Lobby — Red — is operating with renewed vigor but oldtime ruthlessness. This lobby consists of a policy-manipulating segment of the unreformed State Department, its allies in the Central Intelligence Agency, which it controls, policy-maneuvering elements on the *New York Times* especially, and a bevy of self-considered "China experts" in the academic community, spilling over into the Defense Department and Wall Street. In other words, today's Eastern Establishment.

Objective

The objective is to take advantage of the Republican Administration to put across brazen maneuvers in foreign policy that Democratic Administrations did not dare. Peking's entry into the United Nations and Washington's recognition of Red China are two prime goals.

Mao Tse-tung has never been willing to compromise except as a tactic, and is threatening to upset this cunning in

doesn't get all he wants — outright betrayal by Washington of the recognized government of China at Taipei, by ousting it from the U.N.

Background Setting

This is the setting against which certain, astonishing news articles from Taipei must be gauged. Particularly among them is the *New York Times* dispatch that a number of U.S. military men and certain C.I.A. agents have been quietly removed from Taiwan because of involvement in the so-called "independence movement" on the island. This is about as legitimate a movement as the propaganda for a black republic on U.S. soil.

The highly publicized, diabolical "China Lobby" that was supposed to be supporting Chiang Kai-shek always was more of a "cover term" than anything else, to divert attention from the powerful, genuine, pro-Red China Lobby. This latter lobby invariably seeks to maneuver American policy in such a way as to meet Communist demands. Red China's intransigence on Taiwan (Formosa), is one of those pressures.

Discrediting Is Goal

So the discrediting of Taiwan abroad, and artificially-induced "dissent" within, constitute the assignment these lobbyists have

island. Exactly as the racial issue is depended upon by the Red network to create a ferment in the United States ultimately leading to our downfall, so can obsessive-minded propagandists and enemy agents exploit the so-called "Taiwan for the Taiwanese" line.

President Nixon's public turnaround in favor of unilateral concessions to Red China could only be considered as the "go ahead" signal by such conspirators. A slow process of attrition has made anti-Communists the considered "security risks" in government, not pro-Communists. Former Congressman Walter H. Judd and Otto F. Otepka, of the Subversive Activities Control Board, are symbols of policy pariahs, new-style. The shocking manner in which the highly knowledgeable, Chinese-speaking Judd is kept at arms length is a clear signal of Machiavellian policy as regards China.

Third Force

What must be kept in mind, for correct appraisal of Far East developments, is that the only consistency in State Department policy as regards China is the "third force" formula. This is the direct inheritance of the twisted rationalization that made a betrayer of China out of unfortunate General George Marshall. He proceeded along the theory that neither the Kuomintang nor the Chinese Red were not "prejudiced," so he would depend for intelligence and assistance on the center groups or "moderates." This pleased Yenan — then Mao's capital — immensely, for these "moderates" were dominated and steered by

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U.S. Sidesteps Self-Determination For Taiwanese

By PETER J. KUMPA

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 3.—The United States takes "no position" on the question of self-determination for about 12 million native Taiwanese, the predominant majority of the population on Taiwan, according to a State Department spokesman.

Mr. Charles Bray, the spokesman, explained that this was a matter of "internal concern" to the government of the Republic of China.

The question was raised after Mr. Bray confirmed that four U.S. servicemen had been transferred because of Chinese complaints that they had acted sympathetically with Taiwan independence "elements" by sending and receiving mail for them.

Last week, the State Department had "no comment" when asked to compare the American position on self-determination for the Taiwanese as opposed to the South Vietnamese.

Self-determination for South Vietnamese is, as President Nixon said in his State-of-the-World report the "one guiding principle, one irreducible objective" of American goals for the Indochina war. "We seek," he said, "the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference."

Taiwan independence movements, which seek varying degrees of autonomy from the Nationalist government in Taipei or the Chinese Communist government in Peking, have been suppressed harshly on Taiwan. They also have been denounced by the Communists.

Immigrants' Descendants

The Taiwanese are descendants of immigrants from Fukien province several centuries ago. They speak a Fukienese dialect which differs from Mandarin, which is spoken by the 1.5 million "mainlanders" who came to the island after military defeat by the Communists.

Because of long separation,

many Taiwanese consider themselves a distinct people. Though they form a majority on Taiwan itself, political control of the government remains in the hands of the mainlanders. Effective power is wielded by the Legislative Yuan elected in mainland districts in 1947 and 1948 with Taiwanese representation restricted to roughly the proportion of its population to that of all China.

Local Issues

The independence movement flourishes outside of Taiwan, in student, intellectual and other exile circles in the United States and Japan. Approximately 90 per cent of students leaving Taiwan never return.

Inside Taiwan, politics is restricted to local issues and elections. Taiwanese form a majority of the Nationalist Army (though not its officer corps) and also have shared in the island's economic prosperity. It is conceded that in time their views will have to be taken into account on such national issues as the government's fate.

Politically conservative, the Taiwanese have few leftist elements. Those who speak out oppose rule by "mainlanders," whether they be Communist or Nationalist. They differ in wanting either eventual complete independence or some autonomous status with China, perhaps in a commonwealth affiliation.

For the United States, the question of Taiwanese aspirations has been a difficult and sensitive question because of its alliance with the Nationalists who form the government of the Republic of China.

The State Department version of the case of the four transferred American servicemen differed considerably from Taipei accounts. The Nationalist

government there charged that the Americans had provided technical advice on explosive and publicity, as well as handling mail for Taiwan independence supporters.

One of the men was supposed to have been a Navy physician. Others were enlisted men and one a junior officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, according to Taipei stories.

Mr. Bray had "no knowledge" of others being involved beyond the four servicemen. He said two had been transferred last year and since have left the service. For the "same indiscretion," two more were transferred last month. Officials here said they all served with the Military Advisory Group.

Neither the State Department nor the Defense Department was able to provide their names.

U.S. TRANSFERS 5 IN TAIWAN UNREST

Men Said to Be Accused of Aiding Dissidents

Special to The New York Times

TAIPEI, Taiwan, May 31 — The United States has transferred four or more military men and a junior officer of the Central Intelligence Agency from Taiwan in the last month, reportedly after Chinese Nationalist officials accused them of assisting native Taiwanese in plotting anti-Government activities.

The Nationalists, according to reliable sources, charged that the men had given technical advice to dissidents on the use of explosives and on ways to generate international publicity favorable to their cause. The Americans were also said to have used their military postal privileges to help the Taiwanese communicate with colleagues abroad.

In its protest to United States diplomatic and military authorities just over a month ago, the Ministry of Defense reportedly included detailed evidence accumulated by Chinese security agents by close surveillance of the men over a long period.

The transferred Americans include a physician at the Navy Hospital here, an enlisted man in a psychological warfare detachment, an officer in the Military Assistance Advisory Group and a civilian official in the Army Technical Group, the cover name for the sizable Central Intelligence Agency detachment here.

Agent Defends Action

American sources said the intelligence agent had asserted that he was simply trying, without orders, to broaden his contacts among the Taiwanese.

The Chinese security agencies are understood to be investigating several other United States military men who left Taiwan some time ago under routine reassignment.

Both the United States and the Chinese Governments are said to regard the case as a source of embarrassment that they had hoped would not become a matter of public discussion.

For that reason, it was said, the American authorities arranged for the quiet transfer of the men, who were ordered not to discuss the affair with anyone. The United States Embassy has refused to comment on the case.

The embarrassment for the Nationalist Government stems largely from its reluctance to admit that there are any active supporters of the concept of "Taiwanese independence" on the island.

The dissidents said to be involved in the case are believed to be proponents of independence from any government of China, either Communist or Nationalist, on the ground that the 12 million Taiwanese have their own interests and historical identity. Organizations advocating independence operate abroad among Taiwanese students and exiles but are outlawed in Taiwan.

American officials here, who have been trying to assure the Nationalists that United States support for their Government will not diminish as a result of Washington's efforts to ease tensions with Peking, appear to be even more upset than the Chinese over the case.

C.I.A. Activity Denied

They have already had a difficult time convincing some Nationalists that rumors of financial backing by the C.I.A. for the Taiwan independence movement were unfounded. Reports that the American intelligence agency arranged the escape from Taiwan of Prof. Peng Ming Min, an independence leader, have also gained wide credence here.

In an effort to prevent further such incidents, Vice Adm. Walter H. Baumberger, head of the United States' Taiwan Defense Command, reportedly has ordered commanders of American units here to warn their men to steer clear of domestic political activity.

A large number of suspected anti-Government activists — as many as 65, according to some reports — have been arrested in the last three months in what may be a reaction by the Government to recent setbacks affecting Taiwan's international position. In recent months the Government has also expelled an American missionary couple and arrested several Japanese tourists for allegedly having aided Taiwanese dissidents.

Americans Transferred In Taiwan

TAIPEI, May 31 (AP)—At least five American officials and perhaps more have been transferred from Taiwan after the Nationalist Chinese government charged they were aiding the outlawed Taiwan independence movement, informed sources said today.

Newsmen confirmed five transfers: two Army men, two Navy officers, and a civilian employee of the U.S. Army Technical Group, and organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some sources said three more persons were transferred, and others said there were even more.

[Officials at the State Department and Pentagon said they had no knowledge of the incident.]

Nationalist officials provided U.S. diplomatic and military representatives with what the Nationalists considered was proof of antigovernment activity, including an attempt to visit persons convicted of political crimes and providing advice in the preparation and use of explosives, the sources said.

They said some of those transferred were cooperating with each other in these activities while others were working alone. Some of the men admitted that their activities were antigovernment; others denied any such intention, sources said.

But all reportedly said they were acting without any kind of official U.S. approval.


American officials refused to discuss the transfers, but it was believed the men faced no disciplinary action and U.S. military commanders have issued an order to all units in Taiwan prohibiting involvement in local politics, sources said.

Names of the men transferred were not available, nor was it known where they were transferred to. Their activities were believed to have been uncovered during interrogation of antigovernment Chinese and Formosans arrested in late February and early March.

The Americans implicated were followed regularly by Nationalist security police and the police compiled very thorough records of those they met and what was said at some of the meetings, the sources said.

Air America.

Flying the U.S. into Laos



IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE 1968 presidential campaign, the Democrats made an eleventh-hour bid for the presidency through a White House announcement that all bombing in North Viet-Nam was being stopped and that serious peace negotiations were about to begin. This move was apparently torpedoed within 30 hours by President Thieu of South Viet-Nam who publicly rejected the coming negotiations. Three days later, the Democratic candidate lost to Richard Nixon by a narrow margin.

After the election, it was revealed that a major Nixon fund raiser and supporter had engaged in elaborate machinations in Saigon (including false assurances that Nixon would not enter into such negotiations if elected) to sabotage the Democrats' plan. It was also revealed that, through wire taps, the White House and Humphrey knew of these maneuvers *before* the election and that a heated debate had gone on among Humphrey strategists as to whether the candidate should exploit the discovery in the last moments of the campaign. Humphrey declined to seize the opportunity, he said, because he was sure that Nixon was unaware of and did not approve of the activities of his supporter in Saigon.

The supporter in question was Madame Anna Chennault, and her covert intervention into the highest affairs of state was by no means an unprecedented act for her and her associates. Madame Chennault's husband, General Claire Chennault, had fought in China with Chiang Kai-shek; after the war he formed a private airline company. Both husband and wife have, through their involvement with the China Lobby and the CIA's complex of private corporations, played a profound role throughout our involvement in Southeast Asia. General Chennault's airline was, for example, employed by the U.S. government in 1954 to fly in support for the French at Dien Bien Phu. It was also a key factor in the new fighting which

had begun in Laos in 1959; moreover, it appears that President Eisenhower was not informed and did not know when his office and authority were being committed in the Laotian conflict, just as Nixon did not know of the intrigue of Mme. Chennault. But that is precisely the point of parapolitics and private war enterprise.

In its evasion of Congressional and even Executive controls over military commitments in Laos and elsewhere, the CIA has long relied on the services of General Chennault's "private" paramilitary arm, Civil Air Transport or (as it is now known) Air America, Inc.

[HOW AIR AMERICA WAGES WAR]

AIR AMERICA'S FLEETS OF TRANSPORT planes are readily seen in the airports of Laos, South Viet-Nam, Thailand and Taiwan. The company is based in Taiwan, where a subsidiary firm, Air Asia, with some 8000 employees, runs one of the world's largest aircraft maintenance and repair facilities. While not all of Air America's operations are paramilitary or even covert, in Viet-Nam and even more in Laos, it is the chief airline serving the CIA in its clandestine war activities.

Until recently the largest of these operations was the supply of the fortified hilltop positions of the 45,000 Meo tribesmen fighting against the Pathet Lao behind their lines in northeast Laos. Most of these Meo outposts have airstrips that will accommodate special Short Take-off And Landing aircraft, but because of the danger of enemy fire the American and Nationalist Chinese crews have usually relied on parachute drops of guns, mortars, ammunition, rice, even live chickens and pigs. Air America's planes also serve to transport the Meos' main cash crop, opium.

The Meo units, originally organized and trained by the French, have provided a good indigenous army for the Americans in Laos. Together with their CIA and U.S. Special Forces "advisors," the Meos have long been used to harass Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese supply lines. More recently they have engaged in conventional battles in which they have been transported by Air America's planes and helicopters (New York Times, October 29, 1969). The Meos also defended, until its capture in 1968, the key U.S. radar installation at Pathi near the North Vietnamese border; the station had been used in the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

Further south in Laos, Air America flies out of the CIA operations headquarters at Pakse, from which it reportedly supplies an isolated U.S. Army camp at Attapu in the southeast, as well as the U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces operations in the same region (San Francisco Chronicle, October 15, 1969). Originally the chief purpose of these activities was to observe and harass the Ho Chi Minh trail, but recently the fighting in the Laotian panhandle, as elsewhere in the country, has expanded into a general air and ground war. Air America planes are reported to be flying arms, supplies and reinforcements in this larger campaign as well (New York Times, September 18, 1969).

by Peter Dale Scott

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Tonkin Bay: Was There a Conspiracy?

Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and Reality
by Joseph C. Goulden.

A James B. Adler Inc. Book,
published in association with
Rand McNally, 283 pp., \$6.95

Peter Dale Scott

Seaman Patrick N. Park, on the night of August 4, 1964, was directing the gun-control radar of the *USS Maddox*. For three hours he had heard torpedo reports from the ship's sonarman, and he had seen, two or three times, the flash of guns from a nearby destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, in the rainy darkness. But his radar could find no targets, "only the occasional roll of a wave as it breaks into a whitecap." At last, just before midnight, a target: "a damned big one, right on us... about 1,500 yards off the side, a nice fat blip." He was ordered to open fire; luckily, however, not all seamen blindly follow orders.

Just before I pushed the trigger I suddenly realized, That's the *Turner Joy*.... There was a lot of yelling of "Goddamn" back and forth, with the bridge telling me to "fire before we lose contact," and me yelling right back at them.... I finally told them, "I'm not opening fire until I know where the *Turner Joy* is." The bridge got on the phone and said, "Turn on your lights, *Turner Joy*." Sure enough, there she was, right in the cross hairs... 1,500 yards away. If I had fired, it would have blown it clean out of the water. In fact, I could have been shot for not squeezing the trigger. Then people started asking, "What are we shooting at...?" We all began calming down. The whole thing seemed to end then.

Goulden's fascinating book, which has gathered much new information about the Tonkin Gulf incidents, sees the experience of Patrick Park as, with one exception, a microcosm of the entire Tonkin affair—

illustrating the confusion between illusion and reality and the inclination of man to act upon facts as he anticipates they *should be*, rather than what rational examination shows them *to be*. The exception is that Park refused to squeeze the firing key, while Washington acted on the basis of assumption, but fact, hastily, precipitously, perhaps even unnece-

sarily—firing at an unseen enemy lurking behind the blackness of misinformation.

Not all will accept the analogy between Washington and a confused young seaman, but this hardly lessens the importance of Goulden's patient researches. The author of a book on AT&T and a former reporter for the Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Goulden has made good use of his years of experience in Washington. He has not really written a "thesis" book; his method is to stick closely to official documents (above all the neglected Fulbright Committee hearing of 1968)¹ and first-hand interviews with witnesses the Committee failed to call, including Seaman Park. At times he can be faulted for believing so much what was told him in the Pentagon. Even so, the result is devastating. It is now even more clear that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (in his words) "contains the fatal taint of deception." The Administration had withheld much vital information in formulating the simple story of "unprovoked attack" by which that resolution was pushed through Congress.

The *Maddox*, according to McNamara in 1964, was on a "routine patrol in international waters." In fact it was on an electronics intelligence (ELINT) or spy mission for the National Security Agency and CIA. One of its many intelligence requirements orders was "to stimulate Chicom-North Vietnamese electronic reaction," i.e., to provoke the North Vietnamese into turning on their defensive radars so that the frequencies could be measured. To this end, between August 1 and 4, the *Maddox* repeatedly simulated attacks by moving toward the shore with its gun control radar mechanism turned on, as if it were preparing to shoot at targets. In so doing, it violated the twelve-mile limit which Pentagon officials thought North Vietnam claimed for her territorial waters.² Far from being "routine," this was only the third such patrol in the Tonkin Gulf in thirty-two months; and the North Vietnamese had to assess it in the context of a recent US build-up and South Vietnamese threats to carry the war north.

On July 31, just before the patrol,

heard North Vietnamese orders to position a defensive ring of PT boats around Hon Me after the first South Vietnamese attack on the North Vietnamese islands, as well as speculations about the possible link between the *Maddox* and the raids.

Near Hon Me on the morning of August 2 the NSA technicians intercepted orders for PT boats to attack the *Maddox*. Captain Herrick aboard the *Maddox* cabled to his superiors in Honolulu that "continuance of patrol presents an unacceptable risk," but was ordered to resume his itinerary. The *Maddox* returned to a point eleven miles from Hon Me island, and then heard a North Vietnamese order for its attack. This was the prelude for the first incident of August 2—it is clear both that a North Vietnamese attack was ordered and

According to *The New York Times* (Aug. 11, 1964, p. 15) the *Ticonderoga*'s Task Force Commander Rear Admiral Robert B. Moore "indicated that the destroyer might have been two or three miles inside the 12-mile limit set by Hanoi for international waters."

McNamara told the Committee that the *Maddox* could simulate an attack on the coast by turning on special transmitters, but the Pentagon later said the ship carried passive equipment and could only listen.